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Our research explores how venture capitalists (VCs) and chief executive officers (CEOs) jointly affect the risk-taking
behaviour of a startup — manifested through innovation novelty over the new venture’s different life stages. We
show that VCs behave differently for each stage. They generally encourage startups to take high risk by pursuing
novel innovations early on. In later stages, VCs tend to encourage less risky, more incremental, innovations. This is
because VCs are typically sitting on potential profits that they do not want to risk losing in a more mature new
venture.
However, this tendency is strengthened or attenuated depending on the power dynamics between VCs and the
startup’s CEO. We consider two sources of power that CEOs can rely on. One is their structural power, or the
number of job titles they hold. This source of power gives them the ability to influence the agenda of a new venture
by controlling its information flow and decision making. CEOs with structural power also tend to be more optimistic
and future-oriented due to their perceived job security. We argue and show that startups led by CEOs with high
structural power are likely to strengthen the positive effect of VCs in pursuing risky, novel innovations in the early
stages and attenuate the negative effect of VCs in pursuing less risky, incremental innovations in the later stages.
Another source of power for startup CEOs stems from their prior experience with inventing activities, or what we
call “expert power”. We argue and show that startups led by expert CEOs take a more balanced approach to
innovation-related activities given their experience with inventing activities. As such, they are likely to attenuate the
influence of VCs in encouraging the startups to pursue risky, novel innovations early on, to appropriately balance
risk and outcomes during this stage. Likewise, startups led by expert CEOs are also more prone to attenuating the
VCs’ influence in pursuing less risky, incremental innovations in later stages.
Our research was conducted based on a sample of 482 biotech firms in the U.S. that received VC funding between
1973 and 2003. Biotechnology is at the intersection of molecular biology, immunology, genetics, and chemistry. The
integration of this new set of technologies has the potential to transform various fields – pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
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agriculture, veterinary science, medicine and waste disposal. These transformational opportunities joined with
intense competition for patentable know-how creates incentives for startups to generate novel innovation. We
measure innovation novelty at different stages of a startup by looking into whether the patents it filed follow the
conventional knowledge structure of similar patents or deviate from that. Deviation would indicate that startups might
be pursuing risky, novel recombination of different types of knowledge that have not been recombined before.
Our study sheds new light on the VC-CEO relationship and provides insights into how the risk preference and the
abilities of mutually dependent actors affect the innovation outcomes of new ventures. The findings of this study
could help VCs and startups to choose the best CEO depending on their objective – and provide insights on how
much power to assign to the CEO.
Moreover, startup founders can also gain new insights on the potential benefits and costs in receiving VC funding.
Furthermore, our study underscores the need for a better alignment between the incentives of various stakeholders
in privately held entrepreneurial firms, particularly in their late stages. Indeed, although the interests of VCs and their
investees are aligned in their early stages, their interests diverge later on, and the conflicts may be exacerbated as
VCs plan to exit their involvement. Entrepreneurs should be wary of these potential conflicting interests with VCs.
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Notes:
This post is based on the authors’ paper Venture Capital, CEOs’ Sources of Power, and Innovation Novelty at
Different Life Stages of a New Venture, Organization Science 27(2):336-353. 
The post gives the views of its authors, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
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